ISAIAS AFEWERKI - FROM STATESMAN TO DESPOT AND WRECKER: Recollections - A Historical Puzzle

by Paul B. Henze
Foreword: I returned to Asmara from service as an Observer in the Eritrean Referendum at Om Hager the evening of 26 April 1993. The next morning I had a breakfast time telephone call from Hagos Gebre Hiwot in Provisional President Isaias Aferwerki's office--Isaias wished to talk to me. Could I come to see him at 10 o'clock that morning? Of course. A car was at the Ambasoira Hotel at 5 to 10. I spent the next hour and a half in Isaias's office with him. The only others at this session were Hagos Gebre Hiwot and a note-taker named Tewolde.
I made a full record of this conversation immediately afterward, for I was impressed by the good sense of what Isaias had said and felt that the conversation was historic. Indeed it was! But what a contrast with his behavior from 1997 onward and with what he has been saying recently! My record of this conversation follows:
Isaias welcomed me, saying that he felt it was important to talk to me because my judgments and advice would be important for the future of the whole region. He asked about my impressions of the way the referendum had gone in Om Hager and elsewhere in the west. I said I had been pleasantly surprised to find so little evidence of Christian-Muslim strain and so little reason to believe that Eritreans returning from Sudan were bringing religious extremism along with them. Contrary to what I had been hearing from others about Isaias's current concerns, he expressed very confident views on religion.
"The NIF in Sudan has tried to recruit a few Eritreans to spread its line here," he said, "but they have had very little success. The extremists who have come back can be counted in tens only--when they come back here, they discover that Eritrean priorities are most important."
Isaias favors free movement across the border and believes that all the refugees who want to return can be accommodated as economic development accelerates. I expressed confidence that Eritreans will see their interest in maximum development of the country--both economically and politically--and not in being easily drawn into political or religious adventurism. I said the outcome of the referendum confirmed me in this feeling. He agreed.
The conversation turned quickly to discussion of ethnicity, political parties, democratization, and Ethiopia. Isaias remains deeply disturbed by the course political development in Ethiopia is taking. He believes the EPRDF must moderate its preoccupation with ethnic structuralism and ethnic politics. He spoke quite disdainfully of last year's rush to elections, naively assuming that they would win Western approval. He characterized parties based on ethnic groups as harmful to democracy. He made it clear that he wants to require political parties in Eritrea to have political programs that reflect various views of national interests. Religion and ethnicity are out as a basis for political organization:
"People have to be prepared for voting. We have not had elections in two of our regions--Asmara and Dancalia--because they are not yet prepared for them. We want to build political participation from the ground up. We are working on a party law that will be part of our constitution."
I said I thought it important that the constitutional process not be hurried and mentioned the need for Ethiopia to go slowly in this respect. I told him I had already urged Meles to avoid a rigid timetable on the constitutional processes and to be ready to modify the ethnic principle in administration. Looking backward Isaias said the EPRDF had miscalculated on the importance of the OLF:
"It is clear that the OLF lacked first-class leadership and strong support among the people."
Isaias sees Ethiopia's domestic political and economic problems as well as its international situation as quite parallel to those of Eritrea. He expressed concern that the U.S. is pulling out of Somalia too fast. I said that continued large-scale involvement in Somalia would leave no American resources for African countries that were trying to make something of themselves. He said he considered it important for Ethiopia to be involved in Somalia: "Perhaps Ethiopia could push the Somalis into creating some kind of order." I noted that at least one problem seemed now to be settled--Somali irredentism is no longer a worry for anyone in the Horn. Somalis in Ethiopia are happy to be there and insulated from the troubles across the border. Isaias concluded by saying he hoped the United States would continue to be involved in Somalia.
Isaias was interesting on Afars:
"It was wise of the Ethiopians to have made Habib Ali Mirah head of the Afar region because "the fellow is a moderate who understands where the best interests of the Afars lie--while Ali Mirah himself is a confused man who still has visions of himself as a grand sultan to whom all Afars owe allegiance. The Afars who are happiest today are those in Dancalia--for their interests and those of Eritrea coincide."
Isaias described the Afar problem as the result of Mengistu's arming of the Afars who then fled into Djibouti territory and stirred up trouble there:
"The French could have asserted more authority and prevented this. The Afars are at best only 40% of the population of Djibouti and are less developed than the Issas in every respect. They cannot gain dominance. But they have little respect for life, They are a wild people and can be led into fanaticism that serves no one's interests. Our problem is to draw them into development and this will take time. It is an advantage that Habib was educated at the University of Asmara and understands Eritrea."
Isaias considers Yemen an integral part of the Horn. He believes the Saudis treated the Yemenis badly. He is encouraging maximum trade with Yemen in both directions and is confident that over time the Yemenis will make a success of their unified country. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, he considers a time bomb:
"It is an explosion waiting to happen. Money cannot buy stability. No country can develop on the basis of foreign labor that has no stake in the country's development. We will not let the Saudis play with us--we insist on following our own interests. They must learn to live with that."
He spoke very positively of Israel:
"Israel has a great deal to offer us and is being very helpful. We are not going to let anyone tell us we cannot manage our relations with Israel as we wish."
We came back to discussion of ethnicity and politics two or three times--both in respect to Ethiopia and in respect to developments in Eritrea. Isaias cited the American approach to ethnicity as the kind of model he wants to follow:
"People should be free to express their unique interests in ways that do not undermine the national interest and national development goals. Most Eritrean Muslims are Khatmia--they are naturally moderate and sensible. Neither ethnicity nor religion are priorities with them. They want peace and a better life and the task of the independent government we are now creating is to gain those objectives for the Eritrean people."
Isaias is eager for foreign investment, especially from the United States. He wants rapid reconstruction of highways and irrigation facilities. He expected that the World Bank will be giving Eritrea generous support for road development.
I gave Isaias impressions of my recent visits to the ex-Soviet Union. He listened with attention.
Near the end of the meeting I mentioned our stop yesterday in Semenawi Bahri [an escarpment region below Adi Teklesan], and how thrilled I was at the beauty of the region. Isaias smiled and said: "We are going to turn it into a national park and develop it for tourism."
All in all, I had the impression that Isaias had given considerable thought to what he wanted to say to me. His statements about Eritrea's position and present state of development were very thoughtfully formulated. He repeated several times how important it was for Eritrea to have a constructive relationship with the U.S. I said I knew many American institutions were eager to undertake programs to help Eritrea and cited proposals the University of Oklahoma people have recently mentioned to me. Isaias didn't know that this university had a long history of good work in Ethiopia. He glowed when I said I considered it important for him to come to the States later this year. I said that Meles Zenawi would also be coming.
There were a couple of times when Isaias impressed me as tired, but on the whole he displayed considerable energy and sparkle, laughed several times, was delighted to have our picture taken together "so that you can prove to people in the States that I am neither dead nor disabled." He was dressed very casually--light shirt and sweater, sandals. Hagos had on blue jeans and a nylon jacket. There is still very little formality about the Eritrean government. Tewolde took meticulous notes during the entire conversation and commented to me as we went out to the car that he had enjoyed the discussion of issues very much.
Afterward: Reading my record of this meeting more than 14 years later. I find it hard to understand why this man proceeded to fan tensions with Sudan, Yemen and Djibouti during the years 1994-1197 and then finally to invade Ethiopia in 1998. Since Ethiopia defeated his armies in 2000 he has pursued a program of implacable hostility. Instead of welcoming aid for developing Eritrea, he has harassed and finally forbidden most international agencies and private organizations from operating in Eritrea. He has stubbornly persisted in attempts to undermine Ethiopia by offering support to dissidents and hostile movements, including the Oromo movements he denounced to me in 1993. He is aiding and abetting terrorists and supporting Islamic extremists. Since Ethiopia intervened in Somalia in December 2006, he has done everything Eritrea's meager resources enable him to do to encourage disorder in Somalia and resistance to African Union and international efforts to stabilize the country. His invective against the United States now knows no bounds.
Ethiopians speculated in the late 1990s that the attack of cerebral malaria which almost killed Isaias in 1996 twisted his mind. The only other--and more rational--explanation for his behavior during the past ten years is that internal resistance in Eritrea proved so difficult for him to manage that he reverted to authoritarian methods in which he had been indoctrinated when he became a dedicated Marxist in the early 1980s to intimidate Eritrea's population into submission. This has led him to imprison a large proportion of his former colleagues, reject the constitution that Bereket Habte Selassie laboriously crafted in the mid-1990s, and abandon even the pretense of creating a democratic political system and open society.
Can such an approach ensure his continuation in power? Can despotism lay the basis for a genuinely independent Eritrea? It seems doubtful.


Washington, VA
October 2007