BY EYASU SOLOMON
The nature of the intractable civil war in Somalia is undergoing a change, adding an
ideological, sectarian dynamic to the confl ict. For the fi rst time in modern Somalia,
Sufi groups under attack are taking up arms and effectively fi ghting Al-Shabaab with
popular support on the rural plains of central Somalia. This new axis of confl ict,
where Islamist fi ghters are battling one another along religious lines, has the potential
of changing the confl ict dynamics in the long run.
Somalis are generally pragmatic and moderate Sufi Muslims.They do not
share the strict, Saudi-inspired Wahhabi interpretation of Islam of the hard-line
Al-Shabaab group.1 Historically, loosely organized Sufi groups rarely entered
the political arena, with the exception of the anti-colonial wars in the 20th
century.2 Over the last two decades of civil war, characterized by a lack of central
government, Sufi leaders had managed to steer clear of clan and political wars, but
this pragmatic and moderate approach came to an end when Al-Shabaab fi ghters
began desecrating their religious shrines in the south of the country late last year.3
An impressive example is Al-Shabaab’s policy in the port city of Kismayo. In
December 2008, the group targeted Sufi sites, among them ancient graves of clerics
and other prominent Sufi s – sites Al-Shabaab deemed un-Islamic. As Sufi scholars
increasingly felt discriminated against and targeted because of their religious
practices, they saw themselves in a religious zero-sum identity confl ict and decided
to take up arms.
A clear, but limited challenge
Recently, Al-Shabaab fi ghters were able to launch two particularly prominent
attacks in their battle against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the
African Union (AU) troops in Mogadishu. On 7 May, Al-Shabaab fi ghters attacked
the TFG only a few blocks away from Villa Somalia, the presidential palace,
thereby showing the apparent weakness of the TFG. On 17 September, Al-Shabaab
successfully attacked the main AU military base with two car bombs in the capital,
killing 17 peacekeepers.
Until very recently, the main Sufi resistance group, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a
(ASWJ), has been militarily active only in the central Somali region of Galgaduud,
where the major local clans and sub-clans (Habir Gedir, Dir, and Marehan) as well
as Sufi sheikhs have put their support behind ASWJ. While having more armed
fi ghters than Al-Shabaab, they are not as well trained, as ASWJ fi ghters are drawn
from the clan militias which generally lack formal military training. Nevertheless,
the group was able to defeat Al-Shabaab in two strategically crucial towns
connecting southern and northern Somalia. From 1 November until 16 December
2008, ASWJ successfully engaged in fi erce fi ghting with Al-Shabaab in the town
of Guraceel. On 25 January, ASWJ openly engaged Al-Shabaab militias in intense
fi ghting, reportedly killing at least 35 people and injuring more than 60 others in
Dhusamareeb. Subsequently, ASWJ succeeded in driving Al-Shabaab insurgents
out of several towns of the region. In their place, the Sufi movement has established
its own incipient local administration, liaising with UN offi cials and patrolling the
locality. Grassroots support and local clan-backing has allowed this new movement
to transform rapidly from a civil to a military force.4 In addition, ASWJ has openly
come out supporting the new president of the TFG, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed.5 More
recently, ASWJ is reported to be active also outside the Galgaduud region, and have
taken over two towns in the Gedo region in accordance with the TFG.6
It is, however, important to acknowledge that ASWJ is still a small part in
the equation of the fi ght between the TFG and Al-Shabaab. While the religious
opposition to Al-Shabaab and its radical interpretation of Islam is wide and deep in
Somalia, it has not been able to organize itself politically or military on a broader
level. Furthermore, ASWJ itself lacks a political vision and, thus, fi nds it diffi cult to
sustain its rule in the areas it controls.
Al-Shabaab - strengths and weaknesses
It appears that the accomplishments of ASWJ imply two realities. First, the severe
Wahhabi governing methods of Al-Shabaab, which echo those on view in Pakistan’s
Swat Valley and includes stoning and amputations, elicit little local support. In fact,
the same could be observed of all radical Islamic groups in Somalia since the 1990s.
Al-Shabaab gained their performance legitimacy in setting up Islamic courts and
bringing law and order to the areas under their control, giving them strong support
in parts of the country. However, popular resistance to the insurgency today is
reported more frequently and conducted more openly. For example, on 26 March,
hundreds of demonstrators took to the streets in protest against a ban on the sale of
the narcotic Khat. In reaction, Al-Shabaab further intensifi ed its strategy of coercion
and intimidation of the Somali population by carefully selected assassinations and
arrests of clan elders, several of whom have been murdered. In the latest high profi le
assassination, Omar Hashi Aden, the Minister of National Security, was killed along
with 30 other people in a large-scale suicide car bomb in Beletwyne on 19 June,
leading to a strong condemnation by a broad cross-section of Somali society.7
Second, the wide territorial dominance of the jihadists is perhaps more a function
of the lack of any countervailing force than an indicator of any innate strength. In
this sense, Al-Shabaab is benefi ting particularly from the weakness of the other
groups, fi rst and foremost the TFG. As Roland Marchal put it, “Al-Shabaab may
not be so powerful militarily speaking, but it is the smartest to keep the warfare in
conditions that are suitable for its low membership and its lack of popular support”.8
In fact, the movement should be weakened considerably since two of its main
political pillars have been removed by the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and
the introduction of Sharia law by the new government. Facing a foreign enemy,
segmentary lineage societies close their ranks and overcome their internal splits and
rivalries to fi ght a common enemy. No doubt, this coherence falls apart as soon as
the common enemy disappears. In part, this dynamic is causing popular support to
wane for Al-Shabaab.9
Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab is still able to recruit and attract considerable backing
in certain areas for various motives. Besides ideological reasons, religious or
nationalistic, the movement is also attractive for economic survival as Al-Shabaab
has the means to pay their mainly young fi ghters. In addition, the movement
represents a means of empowerment and certainly provides the ground for sheer
power-seeking people to further their political stance.10
At the same time Al-Shabaab is increasingly becoming aware that they are
increasingly alienating the population in areas they administered according to an
overtly strict reading of Sharia law. Contrary to the perception of Al-Shabaab as
a mere ideology driven movement, it did prove its ability to change its political
strategy in a pragmatic way in order to regain ground: Trying to consolidate its rule,
Al-Shabaab quite successfully adopted a new approach in the city of Baidoa by
building its economic, social and educational infrastructure and holding talks with
traditional clan leaders.
Conclusion
The TFG is attempting to take matters into their own hands. On 21 June it signed an
agreement with Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a in which it agreed to cooperate in political,
security, humanitarian and development areas. At the same time, the TFG appointed
a former offi cial of the Hizbul Islam insurgent group, which fought alongside Al-
Shabaab, Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siad Inda’ade, as state defence minister.11 But this
does not constitute a break through in their battle over power with Al-Shabaab.
A closer look at the fi ghting between Al-Shabaab and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a
shows how fl uid clan loyalties can be in Somalia. For now however, none of these
attempts and changes in the dynamics of Somalia’s civil war have been able to
fundamentally change the current stalemate between the TFG and the insurgent
groups, prolonging the ongoing war.
Georg-Sebastian Holzer
is a Research Assistant at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC. He focuses on confl ict management
with a regional specialization on the Horn of Africa.
Notes
1. For a short overview about the Al-Shabaab movement see: Paula Christina Roque,
‘Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab’, ISS Situation Report, Institute for Security
Studies, 3 June 2009.
2. Roland Marchal, ‘Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War’, in Alex de
Waal (ed.) Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, Indiana University Press
2004, pp. 114-145.
3. Mohamed Mohamed, ‘Somali rage at grave desecration’, BBC 8 June 2009 http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8077725.stm
4. ‘Ahlu Sunna Takes Control of Provincial Town’, Shabelle Media Network,
29 January 2009; UN Security Council, ’Report of the Secretary-General on the
situation in Somalia’, 9 March 2009.
5. ‘Islamist Group Supports President Sharif’, Shabelle Media Network, 13
February 2009.
6. ‘Islamist Forces Join Government Troops in Bakol Regio’, Shabelle Media
Network, 27 March 2009; ‘Ahlu Sunnah Take Trade Town Along Kenya Border’,
Garowe Online, 17 August 2009; ‘Ahlu Sunnah Capture Second Town in Gedo
Region’, Garowe Online, 19 August 2009.
7. UN Security Council,’Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in
Somalia’, 20 July 2009.
8. Email correspondence by the author with Roland Marchal, 30 July 2009.
9. Stephanie McCrummen, ‘In a changing Somalia, Islamist forces see support
wane’, Washington Post, 7 August 2009.
10. Ken Menkhaus, ‘Violent Islamic Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in
America’, Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, US Senate, 11
March 2009.
11. Recent events show that the pragmatic alliance between Al-Shabaab and Hizbul
Islam is dissolving. See, e.g. ‘Somalia’s al Shabaab rebels declare war on rivals’,
Reuters, 30 September 2009.
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