9/11 Ten Years On: A Risk Diffused

by Dr Alexis Crow
In the run-up to the anniversary of the attacks of September 11 2001, the Obama administration is circulating two different messages: one for domestic consumption, and one for its overseas allies.

The first message is aimed at rallying political support, and is likely to tout the killing of Osama bin Laden as an operational victory in the midst of a larger strategic campaign. The second message emphasises that the anniversary of 9/11 is – according to one official – 'not just about us.' The Obama administration seeks to transmit what it calls a 'positive, forward-looking narrative' to its allies. Yet how positive can the US and its allies be in the continued struggle against Islamic fundamentalism?

On the one hand, we have moved away from the presumption (led by the US) that the 'war on terror' was the defining strategic imperative – or the ordering principle for international security – of the era. This is a welcome fact for the very reason that the war on terror was unwinnable. It was exhaustingly costly to those who chose to wage it – from the lives lost, to the material and economic costs, as well as from a political standpoint.

The challenge of global Islamic terrorism now has diffused into a set of diverse risks: it has joined the ranks of older Cold War threats such as nuclear proliferation and state failure – and also the ranks of newer 'post-modern' risks such as cyber-war, climate change, and energy security.

Policy-makers need to respond with a pragmatic, realistic assessment of fighting terrorism in such a complex strategic landscape. It will require creative thinking in terms of resources, infrastructure, and partners – specifically, dynamic relationships with new partners with whom America and its allies have not previously engaged.

Crucially, this means that the US should not view risks such as terrorism through a Cold War system of deterrence, which is currently being hyped as Washington’s innovative strategy on terrorism. This 'new' policy of containment and deterrence is not entirely engaging and creative, and fails to take stock of the complex strategic landscape in which Euro-Atlantic societies operate. Yes, drone attacks are effective and promise immediate effect without lasting commitment, but disrupting transnational and global terror networks, engaging with partners on terrorist finances, halting piracy off the coast of Somalia – all of these risks require new thinking. The US could lead the way by adopting a flexible combination of tools, allies, intelligence, and push to engage with countries such as Russia and China.

Such a policy shift is politically expensive in the West: it necessitates an admission that the single risk of terrorism has been supplanted with many others, and furthermore that risks cannot be managed alone and may require cooperating with non-traditional allies or even the 'bad guys'. Only in such a way can the US and the wider West be 'forward-looking' beyond 9/11.

Libya: AU’s lost opportunity

By Elizabeth Sidiropoulos



VICTORIOUS: A rebel fighter stands on the back of a truck with a rocket launcher in Muammar Gaddafis Bab al-Aziziyah compound in Tripoli last Wednesday. The ransacking of the compound marked the effective collapse of Gaddafis 42-year-old regime. The AU has played a marginal role in resolving the Libyan crisis, says the writer. Picture: AP

In life realities on the ground often lay waste to the best-laid plans. So has it been for the AU in the Libyan crisis. Since the rebels entered Tripoli on August 21 the hand-wringing around the AU’s marginalisation by Nato during the campaign has reached a crescendo.

In that period, the Transitional National Council (TNC) has been recognised as the legitimate government in Libya by many states, including 20 from Africa; there has been a diplomatic flurry of activity on both sides of the Mediterranean with pledges for reconstruction assistance… and oil contracts; and the Libya Contact Group met in Istanbul – all this before the AU’s Peace and Security Council meeting on August 25 and 26. Has the AU lost another opportunity and how did it come to be much less important than the Arab League on the Libyan question?

First, although the AU had drafted a road map as early at March 10, it failed to win genuine support for it from both sides of the Libyan fray.

Second, the Arab League and Turkey’s support for Resolution 1973 provided, in Western eyes, sufficient legitimacy for Nato. Western and Arab interests coalesced in Libya. Resolution 1973 makes only scant reference to the AU, but emphasises the important role of the Arab League “in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region”.

The resolution further notes that member states that have notified the secretaries-general of the UN and the Arab League are authorised to take “all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights”. No mention of the AU. Should the three African states on the UN Security Council not have sought to insert the AU into that paragraph?

Third, once Resolution 1973 was passed by the UN Security Council, the AU failed to recognise that if it wanted to stay in the game it would have to escalate its diplomatic engagement (given its absence of hard power) not only with the Libyan parties, but critically with Nato, the Arab League and key countries such as France, the UK, the US, Turkey and Qatar. The Nato sorties, supporting the armed rebels, inevitably shifted the balance of power in Libya.

Fourth, it was extremely unlikely that the Europeans particularly would cede any political initiative to the AU – not only for the oil, but because Libya borders on the EU. African migrants have used Libyan shores as a springboard to enter Europe for a long time; the upheaval engendered by the Arab Spring across the southern Mediterranean exacerbated this, with the concomitant anti-migration backlash in Europe.

Last, while the AU’s Constitutive Act provides for involvement in members’ affairs where there have been gross violations of human rights, the fact remains that the AU lacks the political will (and often the means) to play hardball with some of its recalcitrant leaders who flaunt the very principles that the organisation is meant to espouse.

The West and Arab states were not going to rely on the AU. A drawn-out process of negotiation, while Gaddafi waged a war of attrition on the opposition, was not going to be permissible. Thus, once the “dogs of war” were unleashed, the AU’s road map lost any political capital it may have had as a credible alternative: ostensibly open to the AU’s overtures, Gaddafi would have stalled rather than negotiate himself out of power, and Nato’s entry meant that the rebels sniffed victory.

Lest we forget, Resolution 1973 was adopted in the face of an escalating brutal assault on protesters by an increasingly belligerent Gaddafi, who had failed to heed the calls from many quarters (including the AU) to cease military operations against civilians. Reforms had been promised several times but never carried out. In February and March Gaddafi calculated that the rebellion could be crushed. He was in no mood to negotiate with “rats”.

Furthermore, the Libyan uprising was part of the wave of grassroots uprisings against dictators (mostly West-aligned) that started in Tunisia. Even the Libyan leader had been rehabilitated in Western eyes a few years earlier. The cry in the Arab streets was for an end to these oligarchic regimes that had led to economic hardships.

Ironies abound, of course: the Arab League’s membership is hardly a who’s who of democracy; the TNC’s democratic credentials still need testing; and Bahrain, where Saudi Arabia helped to quash protests against the state, is not the object of the same concerted international response. “Regime change” was inevitable, but probably should not be articulated so unashamedly by Western powers, and the rebels have perpetrated crimes against civilians, too. Yet, these do not exonerate a megalomaniac dictator who did not realise that his time was up.

The AU often hesitates in condemning African leaders who use violence to obliterate internal opposition. Its intention may be to avoid escalation, but when is the right time to escalate the firmness of the dialogue and when is the time to use a combination of tools to effect an outcome? As the AU hopefully assesses its performance over the last few months, these are the tough questions it must seek to understand.

The AU rightly opposes unconstitutional changes of government, but still has to resolve the dilemma of what to do with regimes that provide no real political space for opposition and political contestation.

So what should be the AU’s next steps? Its road map may still be relevant in principle, but developments have overtaken it. The Libya Contact Group has met. The “Friends of Libya” will meet in Paris on Thursday. The AU and six African states (including South Africa) are only observers at the Contact Group. The AU can’t expect to influence outcomes in Libya from the margins of the locus of power or by running a parallel process to that of the Contact Group. It should seek to integrate its high-level ad hoc committee into these processes.

It should also recognise the TNC. Not doing so quickly will make it more irrelevant in the post-Gaddafi Libya and unable to play a meaningful role in pushing for, as its August 26 communiqué said, “an inclusive transitional government, the establishment of a constitutional and legislative framework for the democratic transformation of Libya… and the national reconciliation process”. The latter should be linked to a transparent investigation of atrocities committed by both sides. At the Security Council, South Africa, with Brazil and India, should argue strongly for the UN to reclaim its central role in the process, as the Contact Group reports have argued. If the AU does not take these actions now, its objections to its marginalisation will become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Asia’s Development Miracle and Africa’s Development Tragedy of the Late 20th Century: Key Lessons

EYASU SOLOMON
1. Introduction

At the time of decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s, the level of economic development in most of Asia was comparable with that of Africa. For instance, four decades ago, the per capita income of South Korea was comparable with that of the Sudan in Africa. However, since the 1960s, South Korea has achieved an incredible record of growth to become one of the 26 richest countries in the world and was able to join the trillion dollar club of world economies in 2004 while the Sudan is still one of the 33 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in sub Saharan Africa (SSA).

The Asian miracle and the failure of SSA in the late 20th century puzzles many development thinkers primarily because unlike the Asian countries, the African countries had relatively large endowments of natural resources and hence were expected to achieve higher economic growth in the post independence period.

Although most African countries which gained independence in the 1960s showed rapid economic growth, their growth could not sustain beyond the first oil shock in 1973. By the early 1980s, African countries already began to show sings of economic stagnation and their external deficits had become so severe that donors and other financers were no longer willing to continue to provide support. Thereafter and following the 1980 Washington Consensus, most African countries were forced to adopt the neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programmes prescribed by the World Bank and IMF. However, the outcomes of these programmes were often controversial and sometimes counterproductive.

Meanwhile the divergence in economic performance between Africa and Asia continued. Average annual GDP growth rates for SSA were 1.7% over 1980-90 and 2.1% over 1990-97 while that for East Asia was 7.8% and 9.9% respectively (World Bank, 1999) (in Masware, 2006). While much of the SSA growth was in agriculture, most East Asian growth was in industry. In SSA, real GDP growth has seen a general decline from about 3% in the late 1970s to about 1% in the following decade recovering only slightly in the 1990s ( Lawrence and Thirtle, 2001). On the other hand, for the rapidly growing Asian economies also known as the high performing Asian economies (HPAEs) per capita income growth has been positive since the 1960s. Thus East Asia became an undisputed development success while SSA became a development tragedy of the late 20th century.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides a comparative development perspectives for the two regions. Section 3 presents Africa’s opportunities and challenges in the 21st century while section 4 concludes.

2. Africa and Asia’s Economic Performance Compared

As stated earlier, after a relatively higher growth during the first decade of independence, the economies of SSA stagnated while countries in East Asia which were at similar level of development with SSA in early 1960s showed rapid and sustainable economic growth. Over the period 1965-89, real per capita annual growth of SSA averaged less than 0.5% compared to 5% for the high performing Asian economies which included Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand (Maswana, 2006). As a result in 1997, SSA GDP per capita was US$560 as compared to per capita income of US$4,230 for Latin America, $750 for China and $24,710 for the industrial world (Maswana, 2006).

In its 1993, The East Asia Miracle Report the World Bank (in Maswana, 2006) offered number explanations for rapid growth in this sub region. Among these high savings and investment rates, a relatively high degree of equality, high growth rates of human and physical capital, high productivity growth, (including agriculture), and high growth rates of manufactured exports were considered to be key drivers.

Development theory and practice indicates that economic development generally consists of nations undergoing a series of structural transformations from tradition bound, less productive and less profitable activities to modern technology bound, more profitable and value-added activities. According to Clark and Roy (1997) (in Maswana, 2006), this transformation include the change from less sophisticated to more sophisticated agricultural techniques, from an agricultural to a manufacturing, to perhaps service economy, from light to heavy to high tech industries in post agriculture economies.

While structural tranformation was sustianed and rapid in Asia whose manufacturing export jumped from 22% of merchandise exports in 1963 to 87% in 2000, SSA experienced only a slight change from 7% to 20% in the same period (Maswana, 2006). The main reason for such failure in SSA worng governement developeemnt strategy that neglected the agrciutlture sector. Since the 1960s, the level of the public resources allocated to agriculture in SSA has been consistently low relative to the sectros’s size and contirbution to the GDP. Accoridsng to the World Bank (2000) (in Maswana, 2006), in most African countries, the sector recieves less than 10% of the public investment spending while the sector accounts for about 30-80% of the the GDP.

Another reason for the divergence in growth performances between East Asia and SSA was disparities in savings and investment rates. Saving rates nearly doubled in some countries in East Asia, where they averaged 30% of disposable income between 1984 and 1993 , while SSA’s already modest savings rates fell to 10 to 15% (World Bank , 1999) (in Maswana, 2006). During the period 1980-2004, the savings rates in Africa was 16% of GDP, but it was erratic and remained lower than investment rates of 19% for the same period while savings and investment rates in Asia averaged 30% in the same period and the saving rates in Asia have surpassed investment rates in Asia since the 1990s (Maswana, 2006).

In addition, Asia received an increasing capital flows while capital flows to Africa were limited. In 2007, Asia received over 62% of the FDI destined to the developing countries and the region is regarded as the most preferred destination for foreign investment in developing countries while Africa received only about 10% of the FDI flows to the developing countries.

Moreover, Africa’s trade and industrialisation strategy lacked the dynamism observed in Asia and elsewhere. During the first decades of independence both SSA and East Asia followed Import Substitution Industrialisation strategy that was meant to create domestic industrial base that would be able to compete with the rest of the world at a later stage. However, while Import Substitution Industrialisation strategy in Asia created a foundation for a transition to export-led industrialisation which later served as an engine of growth in the region, in Africa the import substitution strategy led to currency overvaluation, development of parallel currency markets and shortage of foreign exchange required to purchase intermediate inputs used to produce both tradable and non tradable goods and hence transition to the export led industrialisation strategy never materialised.

However, there is no general agreement regarding the causes of rapid development in East Asia. As stated earlier, the causes of rapid development in East Asia are considered to be high rates of saving and investment, appropriate politics, policies, and bureaucracy, investment in human and physical capital, and technology, and promotion of agriculture, export orientation, entrepreneurship, the cultural dimension, and the state with active intervention.

Although there seems to be no general agreement regarding the causes of the East Asian economic miracle of the late 20th century, there is a general consensus on the importance of the following factors: high rates of savings and investment, investment in education, capital accumulation, sound macroeconomic management, relatively open trade policy, dynamic agricultural sector, maintenance of relatively equitable income distribution, and political credibility.

However, still there is no single East Asian development model that can be replicated in Africa. Instead, there are different experiences, policies and outcomes. Booth (2001) (in Lawrence and Thirtle, 2001) argues that there are at least three models of east Asian development: These are (a) a manufactured export led, state interventionist model based on the experience of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, (b) the freeport commerce and service dominated model of Hong Kong and Singapore, and (c) the natural resource model of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.

The SSA’s success could depend on more noneconomic lessons from Asia, such as the existence of national identity and political commitment to growth with equity. In contrast to the developmentalist and distributive role of the state, especially in Korea and Taiwan, where relatively authoritarian states identified their maintenance of power with a successful economy, the SSA authoritarian states have become kleptocracies (Lawrence and Thirtle, 2001).

Lawrence and Thirtle (2001) highlight further three essential policy options: First, policies to support agriculture are important, but should be based on price incentives and market opportunities. Second, industrial policy may be ill advised because of the difficulty of identifying target manufacturing industries. Finally, trade liberalization based on the removal of domestic distortions would be the best option for SSA.

3. Africa’s Development Opportunities and Challenges in the 21st Century

After a period of falling per capita incomes that started in the 1970s, African economies began finally to turn around from about 1995, with initially modest increase in per capita incomes (Bigsten and Durevall, 2008). Since 2001 the African economic turn around has become real and sustainable with average growth rates of over 6% per annum partly due to the resources price boom but also due to improved economic policies.

The progress has been largely due to improved policy performance, particularly the adoption of less-distorted macroeconomic frameworks, increased reliance on private sector as a driving force for economic growth, and the improvement in governance in many countries. Although the political news is largely mixed, the emergence of more participatory government regimes has improved confidence and modestly increased investment in more sub regions of the continent (UNECA, 1999).

However, SSA is still one of the least developed sub region with massive poverty and underdevelopment. Thus while there are opportunities for SSA to claim the 21st century there are numerous challenges.

Studies have shown that to reduce poverty in Africa by half during 1999?2015, balanced policies to enhance economic growth and reduce inequality and an average annual rate of growth of at least 7 per cent are minimum requirements. Policies and programmes that promote broad-based, labor-absorbing patterns of growth are critical to ensuring that the poor participate and benefit from income growth. Poverty has a root in the interlinked population, environment, and development dimensions and must be tackled accordingly (UNECA, 1999).

Another change is Africa’s ability to join the information revolution. Africa is the most subdivided continent?with 165 borders demarcating the region into 52 countries, 22 of which have a population of 5 million or less, and 11 of which have a population of under 1 million. The limitations of size are very real from demand and supply points of view, and this makes regional cooperation a sine qua non for competitive entry by any individual African country into world markets. There is also a need to broaden the concept of regionalism and accordingly rethink Africa’s regional integration strategy (UNECA, 1999).

Industrialization is the key to increasing Africa’s participation in world commerce and finance, is crucial to the structural transformation of Africa’s economy, and provides the platform for enhancing Africa’s competitiveness in an increasingly globalized economy. Yet the level of Africa’s industrialization remains low, as illustrated by three key facts: first, there are only a handful of countries where manufacturing as a share of GDP exceeds 25 per cent?the benchmark for considering a country as having achieved the threshold of industrial take-off; second, the export composition of African countries continues to be dominated by primary rather than by processed or semifinished products; third, the ratio of public expenditure and private investment in scientific research and development remains minuscule as a percentage of GDP in all African countries (UNECA, 1999).

The continent has to devise polices to attract FDIs, has to rapidly expand human and physical infrastructure and fully participate in the global information revolution.

Africa has to build its capacities to accelerate growth to 8 per cent per annum and sustain it at that level well into the second and third decades of the 21st century. Only addressing these issues will prevent countries which are recovering at present from slipping back into stagnation. Thus, in spite of the recent good news, the challenges ahead for Africa to deepen economic and social progress and to sustain it over the next two decades are formidable.

Africa is a region with a very high economic risk. This means that both domestic and intentional investors demand a very high risk premium on their investment in the continent. Therefore the quality and stability of the economic environment within which economic agents operate depends on the institutional structure and the quality of government. Although the recent process of democratisation and some improvements in the process of governance are encouraging, the low quality of governance is still the most severe development problem in Africa (Bigsten and Durevall, 2008). Africa has to address the governance challenge as a matter of urgency to sustain and improve the current growth opportunities.

4. Concluding remarks

Although SSA and East Asia were at comparable level of economic development during the decades of decolonisation, East Asia quickly outperformed Africa in economic advancement. There is now a general consensus on the importance of the following factors in ensuring rapid development in East Asia : high rates of savings and investment, investment in education, capital accumulation, sound macroeconomic management, relatively open trade policy, dynamic agricultural sector, maintenance of relatively equitable income distribution, and political credibility.

Due to these factors East Asia achieved rapid transformation from non sophisticated, low-valued added economic activities to highly sophisticated high-tech led and highly profitable modern economies. On the other hand, Africa remained the poorest and the most marginalised continent in the world.

However, after more than two decades of decline, the African economies saw a turnaround beginning in mid 1990s. The turn around has accelerated since 2001 with sustained annual average growth in excess of 6%. However, to meaningfully reduce the rampant poverty in the continent in the foreseeable future, the continent needs to accelerate its growth to over 8% per annum.

There is no single East Asia development model that can be replicated in Africa. To achieve and sustain higher growth levels, Africa needs to devise balanced economic polices that put the private sector at the centre of economic growth and job creation, rapidly expand human and physical infrastructure and fully participate in the global information revolution, industrialise rapidly, devise polices to attract FDIs, and address the current severe problems of governance.

References

• Bigsten , A. and Durevall, D. 2008. The african economy and its role in the world economy. Current African Issues 40. The Nordic Africa Institute.

• Maswana, JC, (2006). Economic Development Patterns and Outcomes in Africa and Asia. Congo Economic Review. Working Paper WP04/06-2006.

• Lawrence, P. and Thirtle, C. (eds) (2001) Africa and Asia in Comparative Economic Perspective. New York: Palgrave.

• UNECA, 1999. The ECA and Africa: Accelerating a Continent’s Development Chapter1. United Nations, ECA. http://www.uneca.org/publications/books/eca_and_africa/chapter1.pdf.

South Sudan: Opportunities and Challenges

by Alex Vines
When South Sudan becomes the world's newest state on the 9 July, the opportunity is there to build a more sustainable and peaceful relationship with Khartoum and its neighbours. Joining the UN, African Union and other international clubs (including the Commonwealth) will be the easy part. Establishing a fully functioning state is a long term project. When the celebrations are over, South Sudan will begin the difficult task of state building.

Few new states founded since decolonisation have faced the developmental challenges of land-locked South Sudan, a state which lacks infrastructure and economically is dependent on oil produced near the northern border, to the tune of around 95% of government revenue. Its vast agricultural potential has yet to be exploited.

The challenges are huge
Peaceful co-existence with the North is critical. Khartoum needs to honour its promise to be the first to recognise the new state. A long shared history and ongoing commercial, cultural and political links mean that the two Sudans will remain intimately entwined.

But internal politics in North and South Sudan have the potential to sour the relationship between the two states. The recent fighting and bombing of villages in South Kordofan in North Sudan will take on an international flavour after July 9. This is an area with considerable support for the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) who are the governing party in the South but will remain active as a political party in north Sudan. Links forged over decades of war with areas like the Nuba Mountains will continue to be relevant for Southern politicians.

The legacies of the civil wars in Sudan remain unaddressed. Rival leaders who fought the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army/Movement in the south have been paid off or given grand titles to maintain their support. However this is not a sustainable long term strategy. Disgruntled commanders in the South have already rebelled against the government in Juba and this trend may well continue. South Sudan will need to create space to peacefully and openly manage dispute and expectations.

The prognosis is not all bleak
Many doubted that Sudan would make it through the six years of transition mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement without a return to full scale war - that it did is a testament to the benefits of peace. South Sudan will find new partners willing to make investments and sell goods and services. Tapping into resources, financial and human, especially from East Africa may give South Sudan a quicker route to prosperity.

South Sudan's independence is a historic moment. It offers citizens a unique opportunity to put an end to over a century of conflict and marginalisation. International support can help state building but its sustainability will only come from the political vision and hard work of the South Sudanese themselves.

REVISITING ETHIOPIAWINET!

By Mammo Muchie

NES COMMENTARY. No.36

Network of Ethiopian Scholars (NES)

April 24, 2011

“This is my plea to the new generation of African leaders and African peoples: work for unity with firm conviction that without unity there is no future for Africa…I reject the glorification of the nation-state, which we have inherited from colonialism, and the artificial nations we are trying to forge from that inheritance. We are all Africans trying to be Ghanaians or Tanzanians. Fortunately for Africa we have not been completely successful…Unity will not make us rich, but it can make it difficult for Africa and the African peoples to be disregarded and humiliated. And it will therefore increase the effectiveness of the decisions we make and try to implement for our development. My generation led Africa to political freedom. The current generation of leaders and peoples of Africa must pick up the flickering torch of African freedom, refuel it with their enthusiasm and determination, and carry it forward.”Julius Nyerere, First president of Tanzania

‘The present consolidation of African states within the former colonial frontiers runs counter to much of what had been both predicted and desired during the colonial era. It was widely assumed that as soon as Africans came to freedom they would sweep aside the arbitrary boundaries imposed by the imperialists which cut across tribes and overrode the dictates of geography and economics. The continent had been partitioned to meet colonial convenience, but it would now be reshaped to realize its natural contours and return to its natural essence.’( Rupert Emerson,1962)

“...Constructing a nation from scratch: We know we don’t have the knowledge. We know we do not have the resources. We know we do not have the experience. Our conclusion is: let’s face it.” Isaias Afewerki, current president of Eritrea (quoted from National Geographic, June 1996, p.87)

Summary

Failure to defend Ethiopia’s history, is also a failure to live up to the worthy expectations of all those who derive so much spiritual energy from the idea of Ethiopia as a free provider to the world of the ‘resistance-liberation logocentric imagination’ that is much needed as a tangible resource still in vulnerable and penetrable Africa. Ethiopia is synonymous with the very idea of a de-colonising imagination. Its history of successful resistance is the timeless bearer of this alternative decolonising logo for the spread of the African world’s liberation imagination. Ethiopia- as an anti-colonial symbol- is very relevant today, as it was yesterday and will be too in the future. The significance of Ethiopia’s history now, at a time when Africa is being re-threatened with war needs to be appreciated. Its importance during this time when the former colonial powers are returning to Africa with military aggression cannot be lost to both those willing to resist the new aggression and those who commit this latest aggression. At the core of Africawinet is this Ethiopiawinet that is a bearer of dignity and resistance to the repeated humiliation Africa is confronted with by external aggression. Ethiopiawinet is at the core of the African renaissance. It is also at the core for ending Africa’s repeated humiliation. This is because African unity can be anchored with a value and dignity that Ethiopiawinet attained over 500 years of resistance. This achievement by the Ethiopian-Africans that resisted all forms of humiliation is a positive data for building Africa’s united future and to bring back the African unity first agenda to the fore today. It is for these reasons we respect our ancestors, whatever their shortcomings, and problems they were unable to solve in their life times and left behind for future generations to settle. They left the timeless inspiring resources to build Africa’s united future. The positive data they left us in the Ethiopian history remains to this day a relevant asset to build Africa’s much united future. Ethiopians now and in the future must always value and treasure this great historical achievement and not play the current ugly, divisive and cynical ethnic games that the selfish ruling elite play by dividing and degrading this core provider of Africa’s overall liberation imagination into vernacular-ethnic enclaves. Ethiopians as Africans and not as degraded ethnie must unite and strive to make ethnicism as a past by coming together with foresight and sense of history. They should do it now and not tomorrow to restore the historical imagination that will make a difference to the African world as a whole!

1. What is Ethiopiawinet?

Ethiopiawinet should be built and developed from the following characteristics Ethiopia has to this day:

a) Long history-perhaps as long as Persia’s and China’s,
b) An internally generated civilisation (written, art, architecture, music, religion and so on),
c) A history of resisting and scoring victories against economically and politico- militarily superior forces,
d) A unique psychological make up where the notion of the divine and the sacred graces every activity that the people engage in.

The individual, the state and the nation use for their lives divine presence whether they are Christians, Muslims, Judaic and even Pagans. The state had its own ethos and had its own ‘Fetah Negist’ and ‘Kibre Negist.’ In war we note how the idea of the divine is invoked to give courage to the troops when they charge(e.g. Giorgis’s participation in Adwa!) and in victory the people show humility by referring that all their power is due to God.

Whether we like it or not religion is a way of life to the rural majority of the population. And the change we want, the modernisation we seek is to make life better for the majority of the rural areas. We do not go and preach Jeffersonian democracy or Marxism to them. If we are serious we go and learn from them and build on their beliefs and make modernisation sensible by translating it into the language and way of life they are used to. This is how Japan, Korea and others did it by appreciating their context but not rejecting it like the strange ruling elites that replaced the traditional system are doing now!

Even China with its Marxism did not reject Menicusian, Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist values which the population had. They tried to Sinnify their modernist weapon Marxism so that the people can embrace it. Like everything else which came into contact with China, Marxism became absorbed rather than the other way round! They call it Marxism which Chinese characteristics and in reality in China Marxism was not used like in Ethiopia. Mao Tse Tung started by investigating first the peasant movement in Hunan where he was born, not by throwing half-baked and non-comprehended phrases from Lenin and Stalin. He did not select phrases that insult to persecute and even kill his comrades as it happened in Ethiopia. Never forget in Ethiopia after people were killed, the strangest things also have taken place where apparently along with the dead body was placed 'I was a dog' and I deserve to be killed -- or some strange ani-Ethiopian and anti-humane things were done! When a person dies in Ethiopian culture, one always tries to remember the good the person did by trying to forget the bad the person did. This is the noble culture that was inherited from Ethiopia’s past that was abused by doing these strange things to dead bodies!

There is an Ethiopian value system from our tradition that we need to bring back and blend with modernisation. The core ideas are the four key principles of Ethiopiawinet. We need to treasure them, not fight Ethiopiawinet! What makes the person from the South to those in the North connect mysteriously is this shared experience which was passed on from the wider Ethiopian culture confluence and communication.

2. The Mistakes of our Generation

Our generation was engaged in intellectual copying. We ignored both
history and reality and embarked on a journey that has cost Ethiopia
dearly. Basically we said because Marx, Engels and Lenin are right,
Emperor Twedros, Yohannes, Menelik and Haile Selassie are wrong. This was a very dogmatic logic, ignoring both historical evidence and reality. Did we not pay a price badly for this. We still do. We better ground ourselves from our own history, our own challenges and how to change society by a process of grounded appreciative theorising. We did not do this. We need to bring back the anti- colonial and anti- imperialist and
nationalist imagination coming naturally from Ethiopia’s history that continues to be treasured by Africans the world over.

Our generation rejected this by mounting two major myths: a) the Dergue employing Jacobin-Stalinist terror tried to force its hackneyed “Marxism” down the throat of the bewildered population, b) the various ethnic based fractional movements echoing rhetorics from China, Albania, Vietnam and so on tried to create ideologies of Tigreanism, Eritreanism, Oromoism and recently Amharism and anything and everything but Ethiopianism. They even have ethnic flags. We have many flags in Ethiopia now, not one flag that I see every day also in much of Africa and the rest of the world. Others are proud to use the Ethiopian flag, whilst the ruling ethnic elite diversify the number of flags to entrench ethnicism and undermine Ethiopian history.

Ethiopia is in a strange paradox: Ethiopia reminds me of Witgestein’s prescient remark of a nation being run by elites who are trying to disrupt its future by climbing through the chimney and the window of ethnic fragmentation, when all along the Ethiopiawinet as Africawinet door to build its glorious future has been wide open.

What is wrong with holding on and inheriting our Ethiopia and add modernisation, renewal and democratisation without breaking the framework and subtracting the nation and parcelling the state? Do we need to regress by relying on the politicisation of culture, language and blood to blackmail our way into power with Ethiopia as it is or by breaking it up altogether?

I believe the best and most possible cultural rights and expression for all the ethnic communities without subjecting them to ethnic cleansing and other violence is feasible with a healthy Ethiopiawinet. I do not see why we should not organise by affirming Ethiopawinet and maintain active local engagement wherever we come from. The key is to democratise the state, individual and the nation by affirming and not being condescending
to the past.

The theory of the nation which decomposes Ethiopia by weaving the myths of Tigreanism, Eritreanism, Oromoism and so on goes counter to the core experience of the people, their long history, tradition, character and above all their historically evolved nationhood and state formation.

The Lenin-Stalin notion of the nation which the fractionalisers have imported their divisive politics from to Ethiopia is too scholastic, mechanistic, and deterministic. Itemising factors of language, territory, psychological make up and unleashing every petty nationalist bigot to search how his ethnic group might fulfil one or the other factor in full or in part is one of the most unattractive ventures which corrupts science and social practice at the same time.

Neither the ethnicism of Tigreans, Oromos and so on and nor Stalin’s shopping list definition of a nation are relevant to the Ethiopian situation. They cannot be a higher reality to the experience of our people. An experience where there was injustice along with civilisation, a history of epic resistance and a unique psychological make up involving the concept of the sacred in the every day living of all Ethiopians. The attack on this divinely graced Ethiopianet ” wukabi gefafi new” (is de-spiritualising/demeaning!)!

It has been said that the longer we look back in the history of a nation, the further we can look forward or forge ahead in building a collective future. It has also been claimed that history is to a nation as a memory is to an individual. For an individual to lose memory is to lose a grip of reality. It has been a maxim held by African sages: ’They lost their history, so they lost everything.’ A nation, if it wishes to remain a nation must not be denied its right and indeed privilege to make a conception of history that
yields direction and a future and insulates it from falling into a directionless and chaotic path like present day Somalia.

Arguably, contemporary challenges and demands must be taken into account into a nation’s history-making processes, but they must also be confronted to avoid the mindless rejection of Ethiopia’s historical achievements and the intelligent learning from the innumerable failures that is necessary to do individually and collectively as a people. Anything made at the expense of making a nation lose its historical identity, which is not, incidentally constituted from more than the sum of the arithmetic additions of a sum of languages, religions, territory, number of people in an ethnic group, and other variables is to undermine the ontological foundation of Ethiopia as an idea, a dream, project and nation.

Those who wish to opt out make not only themselves suffer, but also those who wish to remain with a positive and constructive rather than destructive and negative appreciation of Ethiopia’s long history. We have seen what came of Eritrea after leaving Ethiopia? We were told Eritrea would be
the South East Asian tiger, but is it that now? Is that what has become of Eritrea by the EPLF’s and TPLF’s gratuitous saying good bye to Eritrea’s core history which is tied with an umbilical chord with Ethiopia’s long social-economic history. History provides self-knowledge to a nation and that self-understanding is a necessary condition to undertake any meaningful development. Lack of consciousness of a nation’s history is not simply an intellectual failure. It can be a moral failure as it can expose unnecessarily a nation to unpredictable danger and suffering. We owe it to our ancestors who bequeathed a nation with history to avoid extremism, negotiate out of our conflicts, and find mechanisms to make social peace amongst individuals, communities and personalities.

It is with a larger purpose and depth of thinking, commitment and dedication that we should cherish both the long memory and current meaning to us of being Ethiopian. There is intrinsic merit to preserve this ancient nation, and not give in to the degrading mantra of ethnic enclosures that has degraded civic Ethiopian citizenship to a particularly virulent and limiting concept of the ethnically defined and vernacularly fenced off citizen. This primordially and biologically condemned citizen must be fully liberated to emerge as the Ethiopian citizen par excellence. There can be no compromise on the Ethiopian and African framework for citizen expression and engagement. Everything is negotiable once the framework is accepted. There can be no negotiation with those who arrogantly and impudently call Ethiopia a fiction and an invention. Without the idea of Ethiopia, there is no idea of a future. Let us not forget that Ethiopia was the first non-European country that defeated a European power. The Japanese sent delegations to learn how Ethiopians organised to defeat a European imperial power. Many Africans in the Diaspora from America to the West Indies were inspired to continue the struggle for liberation owing to this historic achievement. Ethiopia can achieve even more by doing away with tyranny and poverty for good provided it overcomes the pettiness of its politics and reach out to the grand vision of historical presence.

I ask all of you to memorise!

The world fears time
Time fears history
History fears Ethiopia!

Mammo Muchie, DST/NRF Research Professor of Innovation Studies, Also Professor DIR, Aalborg University, Senior Research Associate, SLPTMD, Oxford University,UK.
He can be contacted from any of the links below!http://www.nesglobal.org/symp125/ http://www.nesglobal.org/wshop/node/6
http://agda.uonbi.ac.ke
www.ajstid.com
www.nesglobal.org

The dilemma of exchange rate devaluation arrangements as solution for inclusion

By:-Eyasu Solomon
- Eyasusolomon@AOL.com
Exchange rate Volatility is a measure of risk, whether in asset pricing, portfolio optimisation, option pricing, or risk management, and presents a careful example of risk measurement, which could be the input to a variety of economic decisions. What was surprising and interesting about Ethiopia's move is that the devaluation was not undertaken under the usual duress of “macroeconomic adjustment.” Devaluation helps because it increases exports and reduces imports, thereby increasing the foreign exchange position; and it also reduces domestic spending and brings it more in line with a country’s production.In this instance, however, the devaluation seems to target structural change, to boost the tradable sector so that it can provide the basis for long run growth. Volatility of exchange rates describes uncertainty in international transactions both in goods and in financial assets. Exchange rates are modeled as forward-looking relative asset prices that reflect unanticipated change in relative demand and supply of domestic and foreign currencies, so exchange rate volatility reflects agents’ expectations of changes in determinants of money supplies, interest rates and incomes. I see it differently. Tradable sectors and exports can indeed be key for development. And Africa’s tradable sectors are handicapped by aid and natural resource revenues, which tend to promote non-tradable sectors and encourage consumption over production As Ethiopia considering implementing changes in their development strategies, now is an opportune time to investigate the issue of weather alteration, in exchange rate arrangement have an effect on economic growth or to what extent exchange rate volatility may be responsible for variation in the rate of economic production. Because such moves are accompanied by increase in the volatility of both, nominal and real exchange rates. So, three slightly different takes on this Ethiopian move would be the following. First, this devaluation can be seen—not as actively favoring or even subsidizing some sectors as it would be in the case of China, for example—but as offsetting a previous distortion (aid and resource revenues). Second, instead of viewing this as creating investor uncertainty, it can perhaps be seen as a credible and durable pre-commitment to promoting structural change (provided of course future actions are consistent with this move). The private sector can be assured that there would be durable advantage in investing in the tradable sector. Finally, the devaluation is heartening if it reflects a realization on the part of African policy-makers that the key to development is structural change but one that is brought about in a market-friendly manner rather than in the dirigiste manner of the past.
Real exchange rate uncertainty can have negative effects on both domestic and foreign investment decisions. It causes reallocation of resources among the sectors and countries, between exports and imports and creates an uncertain environment for investment. The most important reasons for a devaluation to trigger an aggregate demand contraction include: a redistribution of income towards those with high marginal propensity to save, a fall in investment, an increased debt burden, reduction in real wealth, a low government marginal propensity to spend out of tax revenue, real income declines under an initial trade deficit, increased interest rates, and increased foreign profits On the other hand, aggregate supply may suffer after devaluation because of more expensive imported production inputs, wage indexation programmes, costlier working capital. Frequent devaluation stimulates speculation, leading to confidence erosion.Such
practice of continuous devaluation not only result in distortions in income, consumption, industrial growth and public finance, but also disturb the harmonious blend of internal and external balance, affecting both monetary and fiscal indicators,e.g. exports, imports, manufacturing growth, money supply and so on. Demand for exports depends on economic conditions in foreign countries, prices (relative inflation and exchange rate), and perception of quality, reliability, and so on.According to the orthodox approach, the devaluation enhances competitiveness, increases exports and bends demand toward domestically produced goods, thus expanding the production of tradable. For demand and supply side contractionary effects “Imports” measuring purchases from abroad, add to well being but may displace domestic production and drain financial resources. Changes in imports prices reflect changes in foreign prices, exchange rates and quantity.
The lack of zeal of domestic corporate executives to engage investment in the industrial sector exposes finance capital to the hazard of foreign invasion, which implies thatforeign investors could take this advantage to expropriate the wealth of the nation, and thus hamper the strength of the Ethiopian economy because capital is mobile, and globalization is about interconnectedness and interdependence as the finance capital available in the economy is being moved at will to the economy of other states. Thus, globalization has brought about the domination of the Ethiopian economy since its basic export is woven around raw materials (the basis for production and further production), whereas export in Ethiopia promotes economic diversification abroad and restricts diversification in the domestic setting, placing the Ethiopian economy in an uncompetitive space in the global trade circle. Currency devaluation on the basis of a certain economic policy is something every nation does occasionally, more so amongst the developed nations than developing ones with the exception of China. Some 20 years ago Canada did it to stimulate the economy to pull it out of the early 1990s severe recession. Canada devalued the currency by 45% at some point. Then again, Canada is economically integrated with the US, over 80% is exported to the United States, and for that reason the devaluation was understandable. The timing also did have something to do with, a new trade regime was on its way being implemented (NAFTA) US did not mind for the border town States benefited from the exchange rate advantage of importing Canadian goods and products to present it for the voracious appetite of US consumers.
Although the depreciation would take only a year and half but raising it back to the level it was prior to the recession, it would take over seven years. Because it would be very risky for the confidence of the Canadian economy to maintain that low exchange rate after the economy got its wing to fly, foreign investors cannot get a good return for their PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com investment if that low exchange rate was maintained, so instead of attracting few more investors the currency devaluing nation can lose many more investors. So, one has to show confidence on their economy by maintaining strength on their currency to reflect a good management and command.
Given the above example its not a bad idea for Ethiopia to devalue BIRR, however the trade deficit Ethiopia has is far greater to compensate by the export increase it will have no matter how large the export is, because Ethiopia is an 80 million nation with trade deficit is into billions. So devaluing the currency may encourage one time (short term) investors to come and take advantage but they will leave once that advantage runs its course. Those who buy real estate would benefit from the exchange rate advantage it will give them, but all others things will rise immediately after. As illustrated above, Ethiopia is an import economy nation. In the long term the country could lose its ability to maintain that same juice stimulant for an extended period of time knowing the way I know Ethiopia. China on the other hand can manipulate its currency as much as it wants for however long it desires for it has a huge reserve, essentially driving the world currency exchange rate. Alluding to the fact, if one controls the US currency, one has the world in their pocket. Ethiopia does not have excessive reserve like China does, as a matter of fact Ethiopia is running a yearly deficit economy, which means it cannot do what China does and come out unscathed. It may help it for a one time currency collection by giving the labor of the citizens to the foreign investor accumulating the extra 20% and using that extra juice the one time foreign investor can increase the margin of profit by a 20%.
However, that’s where it stops. The nation would have to devalue its currency furtherdown in order to get another stimulant juice; the question then becomes where the devaluing stop does. The basic adjustment policy dilemma may be easily illustrated by the simplest of all open economy frameworks where:exports, imports, aggregate domestic output, consumption, investment and government expenditure. Matters would be relatively clear cut if there were well defined correct and incorrect policies relating to macroeconomic stability, microeconomic efficiency and openness.
A bad harvest, or a fall in export prices may reduce both export revenue and taxrevenue. Or, where sovereign debt is denominated in US dollars, an increase in worldinterest rates or an appreciation in the US dollar will lead to an increase in vernment expenditure expressed in domestic currency. Apart from such exogenous shocks, it may also be the case that the characteristics typically found in Ethiopia make it more of a challenge to conduct macroeconomic management. It may be more difficult to control government expenditure, to increase tax revenue, to avoid monetising fiscal deficits, to control the supply of money and to pursue inflation targeting. Exchange rate depreciation may also be less effective if the inflation it induces impedes its relative price effect, if foreign trade price elasticities are relatively low.
Similarly, the counter-inflationary effects of overvalued exchange rates are unlikely to offer sufficient compensation for the erosion of international competitiveness and the expectations of devaluation to which they lead. Policy prescriptions relating to structural adjustment and the supply side. There is less consensus surrounding the causes of economic growth and the effects of openness, with the consequence that there is more debate and disagreement about what policies will increase aggregate supply in the long run. What is the appropriate role of the state? To what extent will privatization stimulate PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com growth? Which elements of government expenditure show the biggest return in terms of economic growth? What is the impact of openness and trade liberalization on growth?
What is the connection between financial liberalization and growth? In what order should Ethiopia exhibit a relatively high degree of export concentration on commodities whose price in world markets is often unstable. At the same time, where the price is denominated in US dollars, variations in the price of the dollar may be another factor in determining how the international purchasing power of a specific volume of exports may change.
So where does this leave us? If it seems to imply that the issues are highly complex, that our understanding of them is still limited, that there is a potentially explosive combination of economics and politics, and that there are no easy answers, then it is because this is exactly what the situation is. But at the same time the absence of easy answers is not an argument for policy inaction. It is a matter of learning by doing, trying to avoid doing harm, and gradually evolving towards a better outcome.The technical (and political) question to be raised is the following: is it really possible – in order to raise and maintain economic growth at 11-15% per year for a longer time - to have a much better exchange rate for the current account balance and, at the same time, a lower nominal interest rate, without igniting inflationary pressures in the Ethiopian economy?
The answer – as always in macroeconomics – is maybe yes. It all depends on inflation expectations, exchange rate expectations, monetary and fiscal policy.Any simple macromodel normally suggests that, in an open economy, inflation is determined by expectations of inflation, the output gap and the rate of exchange devaluation. Additionally, it is well known that the interest rate differential with respect to the rest of the world tends to reflect the expected rate of exchange devaluation. Furthermore, economic growth depends on the existing output gap, as well as monetary and fiscal policy ( in addition to long-term trends, of course, such as productivity and demographics).Even a simple model like this shows that the major challenge is to promote a devaluation of the currency ( under fixed-but-adjustable rates or under dirtyfloating rates) which might be able to bring the expected rate of future exchange devaluations to zero or even “negative” figures. And, at the same time, it must represent a real devaluation, with a small impact on domestic inflation. Is that possible? Again: maybe yes.

“Merkato”, The Home of Two Religions

During the Jumaa prayers, Islamic parching (hutba) will be presented by the Imam. Sometimes it coincides with the sound of the Mass prayers from the church. The faithful will be disturbed by a mingled and distorted voice from the two loud speakers. St. Raguel’s Church has a big building on one side of the fence. The shops in the building exhibit the same confusion.
Mohamed Selman-Addis Ababa)

This land, Ethiopia, is a piece of land on which the fear of God (Taqwa, in Arabic) overshadows; if anyone wants to prove this, just visit Piassa and Merakato, where gold is being sold like a pile of grain. I remember one of Addis Neger Newspaper’s articles titled, “Why Do The Ethiopian Poor Not Rob?”–that article had listed “the fear of God” as one reason why the Ethiopian poor do not rob.

There is a saying about the skills of the Merkato thieves: “they can steal your tattoo without touching you”. But these same thieves are known for one thing–they will return your useful documents if they find them in their loot, and try never to kill while stealing. I think these guys would prefer not to steal for their living. What can I say, I am proud of my country’s God-fearing thieves!

Ethiopia is recorded in both of the holy books of the great religions. Repeatedly, while we cannot find the US or the UK even once, Ethiopia is known for giving refuge to the disciples (Sahabas) of the Prophet Mohammed in the 7th century. When we speak about Ethiopia being named in the Bible repeatedly, we have to know that it includes Merkato–just because Merkato is found in Ethiopia.

Among my childhood memories are the “thief beating scenes” in the great Anwar mosque. In the moment when the barefoot faithful go down and up in an act of worship, the shoe thieves are on duty. Some unfortunate thieves will be caught by the faithful and dealt mob justice. Everyone tries to beat the unfortunate thief at least once. Watching heavy people girding up their ceremonial robes to use their hidden acrobatic skills gave me a secret pleasure. These scenes also gave me a chance to contribute to the beating. I liked this scene so much that I even invited my Christian friends to watch it.

They followed me to the mosque, for they also liked this ‘ritual’ In my childhood home, Merkato, even if they were not many, I had Christian neighbors. As the famous song of Teddy Afro goes, “Is it not Raguel (the church), Anwar’s (the mosque) neighbor?” When the time came for Ramadan fasting, our friendship strengthened. We celebrated the “Iftir” feast together. At dusk we went to my home to share the dates, the Asambusa, and sometimes the soup ready for the evening feast. They even sometimes helped me keep the fast by not eating their breakfast until mid-day (of course, this may sometimes have been because they lacked something to eat). We sometimes made fun of each other’s fasting cultures. They teased me, saying, “What is the difficulty in fasting in the day after eating in the night?” “How could you call this a fast since you eat shiro and lentils?” I remember that I was always the winner because my friends ate meat and other animals products so rarely that it was easy for me to mock them in return, chiding, “you are always in the Lent season!”

My friends were happy during Ramadan because we could buy dates and enjoy them. They also repaid me during their Epiphany and Buhe celebrations. I was with them, playing the harmonica, on the day of Epiphany. The celebration of Buhe was also, for us, a day on which we collected money by singing the season’s traditional songs. It was only much later that I discovered that Buhe has a religious meaning. We celebrated those days not as religious holy days in which we acquired spiritual benefits; rather, we celebrated them as cultural feasts.

I have no idea how the word “compromise” started to be used in framing the Muslim and Christian relations in Ethiopia. In my understanding, the Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia live together with love rather than compromise. I don’t like this word when it is applied in this context. I can clearly recall those relations tied with love from my childhood memories. Most of my childhood friends are now slipping out of religion. But some are strengthening their faith.

Nowadays, I hear that singing the Buhe traditional songs is a Christian role. I urged by many not to have a friend who is from a different religion. The spiritual books I read sometimes have no love in them. Most of the literature contains warnings of the coming dangers of my religion and urgings of vigilence against them.

The books that comprise the counterpart are also as dangerous as these ones. Some priests are preaching argumentative sermons. The same messages are being printed on T shirts, CDs and books. My Merkato today is full of these controversies.

Ramadan and “Filseta”: one side of two coins

In these fasting seasons, when the faithful turn their face to their God and the business of the fasting days mounts, Merkato hosts mobile churches and mosques carried by vehicles. Sermons broadcast by different loudspeakers adds chaos to the already busy marketplace. Gospel songs and Menzumas (Islamic songs) spread without limits. These “mobile churches and mosques” Coax bystanders with their proclamations–“buy this cassette and you shall be saved!” Similarly, they strive to increase the numbers of people who go to “Genet” and “jenet’.

The 16-day fast of the Orthodox Church, Filseta Maryam (the assumption of Mary), is the second greatest fasting season–next to Lent.–for summoning the believers to church. Many Christians wearing netelas (Ethiopian traditional cloth) march to the church of St. Raguel. Multitudes of Muslim believers, who number a little greater than the Christians, also stride to the neighboring Anwar mosque. The reason for this is the Muslim’s fasting season, Ramadan. The priest’s mantle and the Muslim cape, the Christian netela and the Muslim robe go together until they reach their respective worship places. This scene reaches its highest peak on Fridays.

The narrow road that divides the church from the mosque permits passage for only one vehicle. The number of the faithful in the worshiping places, on the contrary, far exceeds the space in the church and in the mosque. Because of this, the believers are forced to use the main roads, especially on the central days of prayers. During the Ramadan Jumaa prayers, Anwar mosque–which swells to four or five times its usual attendance—appropriates a third of Merkato as a place of prayer. The southern Cinema Ras, the western Tana Mall, (and sometimes Mierab Hotel), the northern Gojam Berenda, and the eastern American Gibi, mark the ends of the gathering. This forces the Christians and the Muslims to stand together for prayers. The Ramadan evening prayer, “Terawih”, requires a little more time than usual. The faithful park their cars around both of the places of worship. They pray beside the fences of the church, even designating the verandahs of the church buildings as temporary places of worship. I always wish to take photos of these scenes.

During the Jumaa prayers, Islamic parching (hutba) will be presented by the Imam. Sometimes it coincides with the sound of the Mass prayers from the church. The faithful will be disturbed by a mingled and distorted voice from the two loud speakers. St. Raguel’s Church has a big building on one side of the fence. The shops in the building exhibit the same confusion. The upper part of the building houses a school named after the church, while the other floors are occupied by different shops. Most of the shops are selling mobile accessories and mobile phones; the western wing of the building has shops for bags, blankets and Christian songs. The shops of the eastern wing, however, are providing Islamic articles. The building café called “Henny Penny” provides Islamic foods and beverages for the Ramadan season. This cross-shaped building, owned by the church, has shops in which Islamic clothes and other articles for sale. Abaya, Niqab, Hijab, Bourqa, (all articles of Islamic women’s clothing) as well as some mats for Muslim prayers. Some may dismiss this as mere marketing but for me it holds greater significance” Our poor life style and our culture influence our social life, and this is apparent in our religions too. My mom never missed invitations to religious feasts in the house of a Christian priest. I do not remember choosing my childhood friends based on their religion.

Some of my friends still remember the Arabic alphabets and some Qur’anic quotations they memorized in Islamic schools. In the same way, my Muslim neighbors and I have never considered the “Qes timihirtbet” (church based children’s school) to be more than a kindergarten. But this feeling seems to be absent in the new generation. Today’s Muslim friends of mine are more concerned about the issues of Iraq than their country. This might not be a mistake at all, but there seems to be some danger behind their allegiance. Most books in their homes are about “how to defeat the Zionist plot” or how other religions are working day and night to destroy Islam. The weekly newspapers also exaggerate Bin Laden’s destruction on the NATO forces.

Plenty of such literature is being sold in the road that divides the mosque and the church. The books I saw on both sides while I was writing this article are enough to validate my concern on the issue.

“The Identity of Jesus is Revealed”

“For the Loss of the Scale the Gold Has Lost: Who Oppresses Women, Christianity or Islam?”

“Jesus: is he a Prophet or a Creator”

“Who Authored the Quran?”

“Answer for Muslims: The Identity of Jesus”

It is hard not to conclude that the tension between Anwar and Raguel, is representative of the entire country. Social life is weakening; ridicule for the other side seems to be strengthening. Such tensions were showcased in the recent past. The association known as “The Military Tera Retailers Share Company” conducted a meeting in the auditorium of St. Raguel Church. Because some of the members of the association were Muslims, they attended the meeting wearing their religious capes.

The leaders of the meeting asked the Muslims to remove their capes since they were in the church compound. The Muslim members then demanded to know why they were called to the meeting if this was the case, and walked out of the meeting. Some of them even got physical. Where is the patience? Over the past two years, religious tension is growing and increasingly requiring government interference. Abay Tsehaye, the prime minister’s security affairs advisor, was busy trying to solve the general increase in religious tensions.

The followers of both religions were using their religious holidays to demonstrate how strong their influences are by amassing believers in numbers. Sometimes they speak ill of each other but in an indirect way. They print threatening messages on T-shirts and spread them to their followers. They announced that this “island has no place for other religions. Seeing all of this, I seriously fear that our relationship is on the verge of ruin. The respected history of our relationship may be only history, unless Allah and God intercede for its redemption.